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Craig: Criminal Law - The Fourth Amendment Dilemma

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW - The Fourth Amendment Dilemma: Damato v. State,
64 P.3d 700 (Wyo. 2003).
INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2000, Wyoming Highway Patrolman David Rettinger
pulled a vehicle over on eastbound Interstate 80 in Albany County for traveling eighty-two (82) miles-per-hour in a seventy-five (75) mile-per-hour
zone.' Patrolman Rettinger became suspicious of the driver, Nicholas
Damato, because he seemed unusually nervous, there was a large amount of
fast food wrappers on the floorboard of the vehicle, and his luggage was in
the back seat of the car instead of the trunk.2 There were also discrepancies
in Damato's answers regarding where he had rented the car and where he
was to drop it off? According to Damato, he had rented the car in San Francisco and was heading to his home in Illinois.4 However, the rental agreement showed that he had rented the car in San Diego and was to drop it off
in Omaha.5 Based on his suspicion from these facts, Patrolman Rettinger
requested to search the vehicle and Damato refused.6 Patrolman Rettinger
did not believe that he could detain Damato any longer and allowed him to
leave without issuing a speeding citation.7
After telling Damato he could leave, Patrolman Rettinger radioed
the highway patrol dispatch to inform the other officers on duty of the incident.' He requested they keep an eye out for the vehicle because of
Damato's suspicious behavior, which included Damato not consenting to a
search of the vehicle.9 One of the officers to hear the call was Patrolman
Bauer, who proceeded to drive eastbound on Interstate 80 to "get probable
cause to stop him."'" When Patrolman Bauer saw the vehicle he believed to
1. Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 702 (Wyo. 2003).
2.
Id. The large amount of fast food wrappers on the floorboard of the car suggests that
Damato was on a "hard run." Id.at 708. A "hard run" is a phrase used to describe drug traffickers who are in a hurry to get to the drop off destination. The fast food wrappers are an
indication of this because the trafficker does not have time, nor want to stop to eat food, so
they tend to eat drive-thru fast food the whole way to the destination. Telephone Interview
with E. Stormy Apgar, Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Wyoming
(Sept. 14, 2003).
3.
Damato,64 P.3d at 702.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.Patrolman Rettinger indicated that the significance of this discrepancy was great
because he was aware that both San Diego and Omaha were "known drug hubs." Id. at 709.
6.
Id. at 702.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 702-03.
9.
Id. When Patrolman Rettinger told the other officers that Damato did not consent to a
vehicle search, he was inferring he was looking for drugs. Id. at 703.
10.
Id. at 703.
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be Damato's, he passed the car and then turned around and followed the
vehicle." Patrolman Bauer was still looking for probable cause when he
clocked Damato with the radar traveling seventy-seven (77) miles-per-hour
in a seventy-five (75) mile-per-hour zone. 2 Patrolman Bauer then moved
closer to Damato, who, without using a turn signal, moved into the right lane
way." Patrolman Bauer then turned on his lights and pulled
to get out of the
4
over Damato.'
Before proceeding to Damato's vehicle, Patrolman Bauer called for
the canine unit.' 5 After approaching the vehicle, Patrolman Bauer asked to
see Damato's license, registration, and proof of insurance. 6 Damato asked
Patrolman Bauer why he had been stopped and explained that he did not
think he was speeding since he had just been pulled over by Patrolman Rettinger.' 7 During this initial encounter with Damato, Patrolman Bauer observed the fast food wrappers on the floor, the luggage in the backseat, and
Damato's nervousness. 8 Patrolman Bauer also noticed a bottle of Visine on
the console. 9 He then noticed that Damato appeared to have pink "dope"
eyes.2" Damato also made a comment about the documents Patrolman Bauer
asked for as being in the trunk, then immediately corrected himself.2'
Patrolman Bauer directed Damato to get out of the vehicle so he
could look at the radar in the patrol car.22 Damato did as Patrolman Bauer
said, and as he reached the back of the vehicle Patrolman Bauer did a patdown search.23 Patrolman Bauer stated that it was for his own safety since
Damato was going to be getting into the patrol car.24 During the pat-down
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
Id.
21.
Id. Patrolman Bauer later testified that at the time he told Damato to look at the radar,
22.
Damato was not free to leave because Patrolman Bauer was still in possession of his drivers
license, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. In a footnote, it was added that the district
court found that Patrolman Bauer directed Damato to exit the vehicle so he could view the
radar showing the seventy-seven (77) miles-per-hour. Id. at 703 n. 1. Patrolman Bauer testified that this action was justified because Damato "requested [to see the] radar." Id. at 703.
However, the Highway Patrol videotape of the stop does not show this request. Id. The district court judge explained that the videotape was reviewed several times and did not show
Damato arguing with Patrolman Bauer or requesting to see the radar. Id. The district court
judge believed that Damato reacted the same as any other driver would by not resisting Patrolman Bauer's questions and was fully cooperative. Id.
Id.
23.
24.
Id.
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search, Patrolman Bauer found two small pocketknives, and felt what he
believed to be a cellophane bag of marijuana in Damato's back right
pocket.25 Patrolman Bauer asked Damato what was in his pocket and after
being asked again, Damato pulled out a bag containing approximately three
grams of marijuana."
Patrolman Bauer placed Damato under arrest for possession of mariPatrolman Bauer then put in another call to the canine unit and also
called the Division of Criminal Investigation.28 While waiting for the canine
unit, Patrolman Bauer read Damato his Miranda warnings, which Damato
acknowledged he understood.29 However, Damato did not appear to agree to
answer any questions at that time.3 ° Patrolman Bauer told Damato that he
could help himself by telling him what was in the car and that he would find
out anyway when the car was inventoried. 3' Damato kept refusing to answer, but after several repeated questions he finally told Patrolman Bauer
that there was a marijuana cigarette in the console of the vehicle, and that the
trunk was full of marijuana.3 2 Patrolman Bauer opened the trunk and discovered more than 300 pounds of marijuana.33 Damato was subsequently
charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.3 4

juana.27

The District Court of Laramie County determined the bottle of Visine and the trash on the floor were not enough to justify an articulable suspicion. 35 But when the false information about the place of rental and final
destination were included, it could be evidence of criminal activity.36 The
district court said that Patrolman Bauer would have been justified in detaining Damato until the canine unit arrived, but he did not wait for the dogs and
told Damato to exit the vehicle to view the radar.37 After reviewing the facts
of the case, the district court determined that Patrolman Bauer improperly
ordered Damato from the car, which led to the suppression of the evidence
obtained from the subsequent pat-down search, and everything thereafter.38
The state then filed for reconsideration arguing the marijuana in the trunk
would have been inevitably discovered by the canine unit. 39 Based on this
Id.
25.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. at
34.
Id. at
misdemeanor
35.
Id. at
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
Id.
38.
39.
Id.

714 (Hill, J., dissenting).
703. No citations were issued to Damato concerning the traffic violations or the
possession of marijuana. Id.
704.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 4 [2004], No. 2, Art. 8
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

argument, the district court then denied the motion to suppress the evidence
obtained in the pat-down search.40
The defense then appealed the district court's decision to the Wyoming Supreme Court. 4' The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded Patrolman
Bauer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain
Damato. 42 Due to the lack of suspicion, Damato was unlawfully seized
when he was asked to exit his car and was frisked.43
This case note will look at relevant cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and the Wyoming Supreme Court in search and seizure law based on a
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. It
will also explore the Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis in Damato, and
why it could be inconsistent with some recent precedent by the United States
Supreme Court, although the correct result was eventually reached. Finally,
this case note will speculate that the Wyoming Supreme Court is willing to
depart from federal constitutional law concerning pretext stops when dealing
with the stops on a state constitutional level.
BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 44
Evidence that has been obtained in violation of this amendment will be excluded, and this exclusion has been recognized as the main way to discourage lawless police conduct. 45 While this protection is something most people hold very sacred, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that
some searches are reasonable without warrants or probable cause.'

Id. When the district court denied the motion to suppress, Damato entered a condi40.
tional plea of guilty and was sentenced to four and one-half to nine years in prison and fined
$10,000.00. Id.
Id.
41.
Id. at 710.
42.
Id. at 706.
43.
44.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
45.
46.
See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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UnitedStates Supreme Court FourthAmendment Precedent
The Court first recognized a lesser standard than probable cause for
the intrusion upon constitutionally guaranteed rights in Terry v. Ohio.47 In
Terry, a Cleveland detective observed two men, John Terry and Richard
Chilton, walking back and forth alternately along an identical route." As the
men did this, they always stopped and stared in the same store window.49
While the two men were standing together on the street comer, a third man,
Carl Katz, started a conversation with them. The third man then left and
approximately ten minutes later Terry and Chilton followed.5 The detective's observations of this behavior led him to suspect that the two men were
"casing a job" and he believed they may have had a gun. 2 The detective
then approached the two men as they met to converse with the third man
again. 3 The detective identified himself as a police officer and asked the
three men to identify themselves. 4 The men responded to the questions by
"mumbling something," at which point the detective grabbed Terry and patted down the outside of his clothing.55 The detective felt a pistol inside
Terry's overcoat, but he could not remove the gun. 6 He ordered the three
men inside one of the stores, and took Terry's overcoat off to retrieve the
pistol."
The Court held that a two-part inquiry must be used to determine
whether the search and seizure was "unreasonable." 58 First, it must be determined if the officer's actions were justified at the inception of the seizure. 59 Second, it must be determined if the search was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the beginning.' In Terry, the detective had a reasonable suspicion the men were
about to commit a daytime robbery and it would be reasonable to assume the
robbery would include the use of weapons.6' The Court held when a police
officer observes unusual conduct he is entitled, for the protection of himself
47.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. Id. at 5-6.
49.
Id. at 6. Officer McFadden observed the men walk this identical route about five to
six times a piece; a total of approximately twelve trips. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
at7.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.At this point the detective also patted the other two men down for weapons. Id.
A revolver was found in Chilton's overcoat pocket, but no weapons were found on the third
man. Id.
58.
59.

Id. at 19-20.
Id.at 20.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.at28.
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and others, to conduct a limited search of the outer clothing of the person to
discover weapons that may be used to assault him." The officer may do this
if he can reasonably conclude criminal activity may be occurring and the
person being dealt with may be armed and dangerous.6 3
The United States Supreme Court relied greatly on the decision in
Terry to decide Minnesota v. Dickerson.6 While using Terry as a foundation, the Court established the "plain-feel" doctrine.65 The plain-feel exception states that if an officer is lawfully patting down a suspect's outer clothing, within the bounds of Terry, and feels an object whose shape or mass
makes its identity immediately apparent, the warrantless seizure is justified.' However, the search is unconstitutional if the officer must conduct a
search outside the bounds of Terry to determine if the object is contraband.67
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court had to decide if it would extend the limits of seizure that were set by Terry.6" The issue in Mimms was
whether a police officer could ask the driver of a vehicle, who was stopped
for a traffic violation, to step outside of the vehicle to produce his/her license
if the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that a criminal activity,
other than the traffic offense, was occuring.6 9 The Court held that the intrusion to the driver of having to get out of the car was "de minimis," and that
the officer has already lawfully decided that the driver may be briefly detained.70 The only question was whether the driver would be detained in the

62.
Id. at 30.
63.
Id.
64.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374 (1993). In Dickerson, two police officers
approached the respondent after observing him leaving a "crack house" and acting suspiciously. Id. at 368. The officers conducted a pat-down search but found no weapons. Id. at
369. However, the officers did notice a small lump in the respondent's jacket. Id. The officer retrieved a plastic bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine out of the jacket.
Id. The respondent was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Id.
65.
Id. at 375.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 379. The bounds of Terry allow the officer to conduct a limited search of the
outer clothing of the person to discover weapons that may be used to assault him. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
68.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 106 (1977).
69.
Id. at 109. When Mimms exited the vehicle at the officer's request, the officer noticed a bulge in Mimms' clothing, which he believed to be a weapon. Id. at 107. The officer
then proceeded to frisk Mimns for weapons and found a .38-caliber revolver loaded with five
rounds of ammunition. Id. The actual frisk is not a real issue in Minms because as outlined
in Terry, once the officer reasonably concluded Mimms might be armed he was entitled to
conduct a limited search for weapons. Id. at I11.
70.
Id.
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car or standing next to the car.7 The Court said this minor intrusion was
justified when balanced against the safety of the officer.72
In Whren v. United States, the Court was asked to decide on the validity of a pretext stop.73 The Court held this question was answered in
United States v. Robinson, when the court decided that a traffic-violation
arrest would not be invalidated by the fact that it was "a mere pretext for a
narcotics search. 74 The Court stated that if the officer was justified in making the initial stop, the legal justification would not be invalidated because
the officer's actual motive was not the legal justification for the initial stop.75
The United States Supreme Court was asked to revisit the validity of
pretext stops in Arkansas v. Sullivan.76 In Sullivan, the Court confirmed the
position taken in Whren that an arrest based on a traffic violation would not
be invalidated just because it was a pretext for a narcotics search.77 The Arkansas Supreme Court made the decision that it could interpret the United
71.
id.
72.
Id. The state justified the removal of the driver of the car for safety reasons. Id. at
109-10. The state argued that it was ordinary practice to order all drivers out of the car whenever there was a traffic violation because establishing face-to-face confrontation diminishes
an otherwise substantial possibility that there will be an assault on the officer. Id. at 110. The
state offered into evidence a study that shows "30% of police shootings occurred when a
police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile." Id. (citing Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3 (1972)).
73.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). In Whren, plainclothes policemen
were patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked vehicle. Id. at 808. The officers observed
a vehicle, with youthful occupants, stopped at a stop sign for an unusual amount of time. Id.
The vehicle suddenly turned right, without signaling, and drove off at an "unreasonable
speed." Id. The officers decided to approach the vehicle and immediately observed two large
bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in Whren's hands. Id. at 808-09. The petitioners
argued that to avoid the danger of officers stopping people for impermissible reasons, such as
race, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should not be whetherprobable cause exists
to justify the stop, but whether a reasonable police officer would have made the stop for the
reason given. Id. at 810. For further discussion of this argument, see infra note 277.
74.
Id. at 812-13 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)). In
Robinson, an officer pulled over the respondent and subsequently arrested him for driving
with a revoked license. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220. After placing Robinson under arrest, the
officer conducted a search of Robinson. Id. at 221. While the officer was conducting the patdown search, he recovered a crumpled up cigarette package, which contained heroin. Id .at
222-23. The United States Supreme Court ruled that when an officer has probable cause for
an arrest, a more extensive search of the suspect is authorized. Id. at 236.
75.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138
(1978)).
76.
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
77.
Id. at 771-72. In Sullivan, an officer pulled over a driver for having improperly tinted
windows. Id. at 769. When the officer looked at the driver's license, he realized he had information that the driver was involved in narcotics. Id. at 770. The officer then arrested the
driver for speeding, driving without his registration and proof of insurance, carrying a weapon
(a roofing hatchet found on the floor), and improper window tinting. Id. The officer conducted an inventory of the vehicle and discovered a bag containing what appeared to be
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Id.
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States Constitution to give greater protections than what the United States
Supreme Court provided.7" The United States Supreme Court addressed this
issue by stating that while a state can impose greater restrictions on police
activity in regards to state law, the state may not impose greater restrictions
regarding federal constitutional law when the United States Supreme Court
has specifically decided not to impose those greater restrictions.7 9 In other
words, "had the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that it could not apply
Whren under its own state constitution, the [United States Supreme] Court
would not interfere."'
Another aspect of search and seizure law is the "totality of the circumstances" test used to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.
The United States Supreme Court recently encountered a case in which the
"totality of the circumstances" test was evaluated.8 ' In United States v. Arvizu, the defendant was stopped by a border patrol agent on a road rarely
traveled, except by smugglers trying to avoid the border patrol checkpoint.8 2
The border patrol agent found Arvizu to be suspicious for several reasons.8 3
First, the agent was suspicious simply because of the road being traveled."
The agent had characterized this road as being a way for smugglers to avoid
the border patrol checkpoint, and the timing of the incident coincided with
the point when agents began heading back to the checkpoint for a shift
change, leaving the area unpatrolled s5 When the agent actually saw the ve-

78.
79.

Id. at 772.
Id. In the concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressed similar concerns as the

Arkansas Supreme Court regarding the issue of a pretext stop as a way to intrude on an individual's liberty and privacy. Id. at 772-73 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

She described, along

with the Arkansas Supreme Court, an unwillingness to sanction conduct when an officer waits
for a driver suspected of criminal conduct to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, in
order to arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. Id. at
773 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). While she was concerned about this, she stated that the Court
has held that this type of official discretion is unlimited by the Fourth Amendment as she
joined the Court's opinion based on the current case law. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The
primary case Justice Ginsburg cited was Atwater v. LagoVista, in which she was part of the
dissenting opinion. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Atwater v. LagoVista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001)). Justice Ginsburg also stated that she hoped the Court would reconsider its recent

precedent in the case that the Court's decision in Atwater did not prove to be correct. Id.
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).

She directed the Court to consider Vasquez v. Hillery, which

observed the Court has departed from stare decisis when necessary. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986)).

80.

Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 705 (Wyo. 2003).

81.

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).

Id. at 268.
Id. at 269-72.
Id. at 269.
Id. The agent was aware that alien smugglers were most active when the agents were
on their way back to the checkpoint. Id. The agent was also aware that a fellow agent had
82.
83.
84.
85.

apprehended a minivan using the same route and saw the occupants of the vehicle throwing
bundles of marijuana out the door. Id. at 269-70.
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hicle he noticed it was a minivan with five occupants inside. 6 A few minutes later, the children in the minivan started waving at the agent in a very
awkward fashion.8" The agent also found the driver of the van to be suspicious because he appeared to be very stiff and rigid.88 It appeared that the
driver was trying to pretend the agent was not there. 9 The agent also noticed that the knees of two of the children in the back seat appeared to be
propped up on something on the floor."
The agent then radioed for a registration check and learned that the
minivan was registered in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling.9 ' The agent proceeded to pull the vehicle over.92 When the agent
approached Arvizu, he asked permission to search the vehicle, and Arvizu
consented.93 The agent found a duffle bag full of marijuana under the children's feet, and another bag of marijuana in the very rear of the vehicle."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed each factor individually and held that the factors present were not enough to render the
stop permissible.95 The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the
Court of Appeals and unanimously reversed its decision.96 The Court held
that by allowing the officer to use the "totality of the circumstances" he may
draw from his own experience and specialized training to make inferences
about all of the information available.97 The United States Supreme Court
stated the Court of Appeals erred by evaluating and rejecting the factors in
isolation from each other because it did not view the factors in light of the

86.
Id. at 270. The minivan is significant because the agent knew that this was one type
of vehicle smugglers use when making deliveries. Id. The occupants of the minivan consisted of a man, a woman, and three children. Id.
87.
Id. at 270-71. The agent believed the children were being instructed to wave. Id. at
271. The odd waving continued for about four to five minutes. Id.
88.
Id. at 270.
89.
Id. The agent stated this type of behavior is suspicious because most drivers look to
see what is going on, and most drivers wave to border patrol agents. Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 271.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 271-72.
94.
Id. at 272. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit looked at each
factor individually, and ruled that many of the factors in this situation carried no weight in a
Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. These factors include the defendant's slowing down of the
vehicle, the defendant's failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's
knees, and their odd waving. Id. The court concluded that the road's use by smugglers, the
proximity between the defendant's trip and the agents' shift change, and the use of the minivan were the only factors that could be used to find reasonable suspicion. Id. at 273.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 278.
97.
Id. at 273.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 4 [2004], No. 2, Art. 8
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

totality of the circumstances.9" The Court found when the factors are
weighed together the agent did have reasonable suspicion to detain Arvizu.
UnitedStates Court of Appealsfor the Tenth CircuitFourthAmendment
Precedent
In United States v. Wood, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit decided whether reasonable suspicion was present in order for
an officer to search a car during a routine traffic stop. °° The court reiterated
the two-part inquiry that was established in Terry.l°' First, it must be determined if the stop was justified. 2 The second question is whether the officer's actions during the stop reasonably related in scope to the reason why
the stop occurred in the first place." 3 The court held that during traffic stops
for speeding the officer may ask questions, examine the documentation, and
run computer verifications to make sure the driver has a valid driver's license and is entitled to drive the vehicle."° When the driver has shown a
valid driver's license and can show that he is entitled to drive the vehicle, the
officer must let the driver proceed on his way without further delay.' °5 The
officer may expand the detention beyond what is reasonably necessary as
long as the person stopped consents to the expansion."
The officer may
only expand the detention beyond its initial purpose without consent if he
has a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity
other than the traffic violation.'0 7 If the person stopped will not consent to a
search, the officer cannot use the refusal to aid in forming reasonable suspicion.'0o
The court also reiterated that a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend on one factor, but on the "totality of the circum98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 277.
100.
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945-46 (10th Cir. 1997).
101.
Id. at 945 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
102. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). In Terry, the Court explained that there is no test to
determine the reasonableness of an intrusion upon a private person other than to balance the
need of the search against the invasion of the search. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)). "And in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry,
392 U.S. at 21.
103.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
104.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 (citing United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir.
1996)).
105.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 (citing United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir.
1996)).
106.
Id. at 946.
107.
Id. (citing United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1069 (10th Cir. 1995)).
108.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 946 (citing United States v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir.
1993)).
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stances."' 9 When determining the "totality of the circumstances" the court
must examine the factors both individually and in the aggregate, use common sense and ordinary human experience, and give deference to a law enforcement officer's ability to separate innocent and suspicious behavior."0
The court emphasized that although reasonable suspicion may be found
based on factors that could be present in innocent travel, "some facts must be
outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations
as to be innocuous.""'
In United States v. Williams, the Tenth Circuit addressed similar issues as those in Wood."' In Williams, the court again used the "totality of
the circumstances" test.' The court emphasized that when evaluating the
totality of the circumstances, it is appropriate to take into consideration
common sense and ordinary human experience, and the officer's ability to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious behavior." 4 The court did point
out that although these are relevant considerations, an officer cannot base
reasonable suspicion on inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches." 5

109.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 946 (citing United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1456 (10th Cir.
1992)).
110.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 946.
111.
Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989); United States v. Lee, 73
F.3d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1996)). In Wood, the first factor that was taken into account by
the district court for the reasonable suspicion of the officer was Wood's unusual travel plans.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 946. Mr. Wood told the officer that he was only traveling in the car one
way because he had originally flown to Sacramento, California, where the car was rented, but
wanted to drive back to Kansas to enjoy the scenery. Id. The officer and the district court
also found it suspicious that Mr. Wood could afford to take a vacation because he was an
unemployed painter. Id. at 946-47. The district court also found that the officer could have
established reasonable suspicion from the presence of fast food wrappers and open maps in
the passenger compartment. Id. at 947. The Tenth Circuit did not agree with this reasoning
and believed that open maps and fast food wrappers are consistent with cross-country travel
and that it cannot reasonably give rise to a suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Another factor
that weighed heavily in the district courts decision was the extreme nervousness of Mr. Wood
during the traffic stop. Id. at 948. The Court of Appeals once again disagreed and stated that
it is not uncommon for most people to become nervous when confronted by a law enforcement officer, whether they are guilty or innocent. Id. The court noted that nervousness is of
limited significance and that when relying on nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion
it should be treated with caution. Id. at 948(citing United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874,
879 (10th Cir. 1994)). The final factor the district court relied on in finding reasonable suspicion was that Mr. Wood had a prior narcotics conviction. Wood, 106 F.3d at 948. The court
again cautioned that prior criminal involvement alone is not enough to create a reasonable
suspicion to change a traffic stop to a narcotics or weapons investigation. Id.
112.
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001).
113. Id.at 1268.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. The court had to take into consideration five different factors under the "totality
of the circumstances" test. Id. at 1267-70. The first factor, which the court promptly refused
to consider, was Williams' refusal to allow the officer to search his car. Id. at 1268. Next,
the court had to consider Williams' "uncommon and extreme" nervousness. Id. The court
held that while nervousness is of limited significance in gathering reasonable suspicion, ex-
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Wyoming Supreme Court Fourth Amendment Precedent
In State v. Welch, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided the issue of
what constitutes reasonable suspicion, and how much time can pass before a
stop is considered unreasonable under the standards of the United States
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution." 6 In Welch, a highway patrol
officer stopped a pickup truck with a topper on Interstate 80 for failing to
properly signal a lane change." 7 As the officer approached the truck, he
noticed someone in the back of the truck who appeared to be sleeping, and a
plastic liner, which was quite clean."' Once the officer got to the front of
the truck, he noticed a large clove of garlic, and a radar detector.' The officer looked through the window of the topper and noticed that the ceiling of
the topper was sagging down approximately two inches in the center. 20
When the officer asked the driver who owned the vehicle, the driver pronounced the name on the registration differently from how it was spelled.'
The driver told the officer that he was coming from San Diego, which made
the officer suspicious because San Diego "or practically anywhere in Southem California is a major drug source for narcotics coming into our country.""'22 The officer returned to the patrol car to issue a warning and he requested that the dispatcher send the canine unit.'23 While waiting for the
canine unit, the officer began asking the driver questions about his trip, who
the man in the back was, and if he had any weapons in the cab. 24 The officer stated that as the stop went on the driver became more nervous, and he
thought it was strange that the man in the back remained sleeping for so
long.'25 The canine unit arrived about thirty-five minutes after they were
called, and the dog alerted the officer that there was something in the left
front of the topper.'26 The officer found a block of marijuana, and after a full
search of the vehicle found approximately 347 pounds of marijuana.'27

treme and continued nervousness is entitled to somewhat more weight. Id. The court distinguished the nervousness in this case with the nervousness in Wood. Id. at 1268-69. In Wood,
there appeared to be the more common situation; a citizen first exhibits signs of nervousness
but then tends to "settle down" as the traffic stop continues. Id. at 1268-69. In Williams, the
officer testified that the defendant's nervousness did not dissipate throughout the entire stop.
Id.at 1269.
116.
State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1994).
117. Id.at 602. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-217(b) (LexisNexis 1989).
118.
Welch, 873 P.2d at 602.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.at 603.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.The officer testified that when you make a traffic stop, usually the people who are
sleeping wake up and look around. Id.
126.
Id.
127. Id.
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The defense asked for a motion to suppress the evidence, and the
District Court of Albany County granted the motion, stating that the search
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. 12 The district court
concluded that while the officer made a lawful stop, the detention after what
the officer lacked a
was necessary to conduct the stop was unlawful because
29
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal behavior.
The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the
officer made a lawful stop, but the Wyoming Supreme Court believed that
the officer had reasonable articulable suspicions to justify detaining the
driver. 30 The court discussed that conduct which may seem innocent can
form the basis for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be in proThe court believed the officer was correct in taking all of the obgress.'
servations he had made and putting them together as a13 2"totality of the circumstances" to form a reasonable articulable suspicion.
The Wyoming Supreme Court also concluded fifty minutes was not
an unreasonable amount of time to detain the driver while waiting for the
narcotics dog to arrive.' 33 The court backed this decision by comparing it to
United States v. Hardy, which stated that a fifty-minute detention was sufficiently short given the rural nature of the area.' 34
PRINCIPAL CASE

The District Court of Laramie County originally held that all of the
evidence found by Patrolman Bauer must be suppressed. 3 After the state
filed for reconsideration, the court changed it's ruling and denied the motion
to suppress based on the theory that the evidence would have been inevitably
discovered by the canine unit. 6 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court
was asked to determine whether the continued detention of Mr. Damato was
justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion.'3 7

128.
Id. at 603-04.
129.
Id. at 604.
130. Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Glover, 957
131.
F.2d 1004, 1013 (2d Cir. 1992)).
132.
Welch, 873 P.2d at 604-05.
133.
Id. at 605.
134. Id. (citing United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 760 (11 th Cir. 1998)). In Hardy, the

court stated that a narcotics dog should not accompany every state trooper at all times.
Hardy, 855 F.2d at 760.
135.
Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003).

136.

Id.

137.

Id. at 702.
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Majority
Justice Golden, writing for the majority, first addressed the fact that
a traffic stop is a seizure, which makes it fall within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.' 38 While a traffic stop is a seizure, it is more similar to
an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and should be analyzed
under the principles of Terry v. Ohio.'39
The court then evaluated the circumstances of Patrolman Bauer's
stop under the two-part inquiry set out in Terry.4 ° The court expressed concerns about Patrolman Bauer following Damato's vehicle "to get probable
cause to stop it.'' l The court also expressed concern that it believed that
Damato was being stopped and released in a "tag team" fashion with the
hopes that the next officer would be more successful in getting the canine
unit in a reasonable time.'42 The court also acknowledged that under Whren
the subjective intentions of the officer do not affect an ordinary, probable
cause Fourth Amendment analysis.'43 Because Damato was contesting the
search under the United States Constitution, the court admitted that it had no
choice but to follow the rule of law set forth in Whren.'" Despite its reluctance to follow this rule, the court found that the first part of the inquiry was
met since Patrolman Bauer witnessed Damato driving seventy-seven (77) in
a seventy-five (75) mile-per-hour zone."'
After finding the initial stop valid, the court analyzed the facts to determine whether the actions taken by Patrolman Bauer were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.' 46 Since Patrolman
Bauer pulled Damato over for speeding, he was authorized to request a
driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a
citation.'4 7 However, the driver must then be allowed to proceed without
further delay unless the continued detention can be justified by a reasonable
articulable suspicion. 48 The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with the dis138. Id. at 704 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
139. Damato, 64 P.3d at 704 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
140. Damato, 64 P.3d at 705.
141.
Id.
142. Id. at 705-06. The Wyoming Supreme Court's fears were similar to those of the
Arkansas Supreme Court noted in Sullivan. Id. at 705. Part of the Arkansas Supreme Court's
fears was that by validating arrests based on pretext stops, police officers would have "disturbing discretion to intrude on individuals' liberty and privacy." Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532
U.S. 769, 772-73 (2001).
143.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 705 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 706. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-1201 (LexisNexis 2001).
146.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 706 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
147.
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996)).
148.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 706 (citing Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo.
1998)).
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trict court's ruling that Patrolman Bauer did not adequately explain the necessity of requesting Damato to exit the vehicle to view the monitor, or why
Damato needed to get into the patrol car to view the monitor when it was
visible from outside of the vehicle.'4 9 Since Patrolman Bauer did not have
any reason to believe Damato was armed and dangerous, the frisk violated
Damato's Fourth Amendment rights.15 °
The court then addressed the issue of whether Patrolman Bauer
could detain Damato for longer than the time it takes to complete a routine
traffic stop.' Initially, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that it has previously held that a detention must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity."' The Wyoming Supreme Court then disagreed
with the district court on the issue of whether a forty-four minute detention
of Damato was too long for a routine traffic stop.' The court did not believe the factors Patrolman Bauer relied on were enough to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'54
First, the court refused to take into consideration Damato denying
consent to a search of the vehicle during the stop initiated by Patrolman Rettinger.'5 5 This refusal caused Patrolman Rettinger to suspect drugs, which
Patrolman Bauer relied on in his stop.'56 The only remark the court made
about this factor was that "[t]he failure to consent to a search cannot form
any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion. Thus, [it] has no place in our
determination."' ' "
Next, the court considered Damato's "extreme nervousness."'' 5 8 The
court stated nervousness is generally of limited significance due to the fact
that most citizens, whether innocent or guilty, exhibit signs of nervousness
when confronted by law enforcement.' 59 However, the court did acknowledge "extreme and continued nervousness" can be taken into consideration.' 6° Officer Rettinger explained Damato's extreme nervousness as heavy
sweating, his carotid artery pulsating hard and fast, and an inability to keep
eye contact.' 6' The court believed that this nervousness was as consistent
with innocence as with criminal activity because of the continued line of
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Damato, 64 P.3d at 706.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Damato, 64 P.3d at 708.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Damato, 64 P.3d at 709.
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questioning by Patrolman Rettinger. 62 The court did not believe Patrolman
Rettinger treated this as a routine traffic stop, so there was no reason Damato
should have reacted to it as a routine traffic stop.'63
Next, the court evaluated the importance of the discrepancies in
Damato's answers to where he rented the car, and where the rental agreement stated he rented the car."6 The court did not concede to the argument
that the officers knew that both San Diego and Omaha were known drug
hubs, because most large cities in the western states are known drug hubs.'
The court stated that the discrepancy could have been evidence of criminal
activity, but since Patrolman Rettinger did not believe Damato was in possession of a stolen car he should have asked for an explanation." Since he
did not ask for an explanation, Patrolman
Rettinger based his suspicion upon
67
inconsistency, which is prohibited.
The final factors the court looked at were the luggage in the back
seat and the fast food wrappers on the floor. 61 The court did not take these
factors into consideration because these factors can be used to describe "a
very large category of presumably innocent travelers and any suspicion associated with these items is virtually nonexistent." 69 The court decided each
of the factors was innocent under the totality of the circumstances, and neither of them was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion for Patrolman Rettinger. 71 Since Patrolman Bauer relied on these facts, and called the
canine unit before he did an investigation of his own, the court ruled that
Damato was detained without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the
71
Fourth Amendment.'
Dissent
The dissent, written alone by Justice Hill, described the majority decision as an "inexplicable departure" from previous precedent at a state and
national level. 77 The dissent argued the majority "shrugs off' the issue of

162.
Id. After Patrolman Rettinger ran Damato's license he returned to the vehicle and
began asking if Damato had any large amounts of money or drugs in the car. Id. He also
asked Damato if there was some reason why he could not search the vehicle. Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. at 710.
167.
Id.; United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 1997). See also infra notes
203-05 and accompanying text.
168. Damato, 64 P.3d at 710.
169. Id. (quoting Wood, 106 F.3d at 947 (citation omitted)).
170. Damato, 64 P.3d at 710.
171.
Id. The court reversed the decision of the district court and allowed Damato to withdraw his plea of guilty. Id. See Wyo. R. CRIM. P. I I(a)(2).
172. Damato, 64 P.3d at 710 (Hill, J., dissenting).
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inevitable discovery too quickly.'
The dissent stated that even if it decided
the pat down and the opening of the trunk were in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, it could accept the drugs would have been inevitably discovered by the canine unit due to the reasonableness of the detention. 74
The dissent also disagreed with the fact that Damato was "commanded to exit his car" by Patrolman Bauer, leading to the subsequent patdown search.' 75 The dissent argued Damato exited the car and proceeded
with Patrolman Bauer voluntarily, and Patrolman Bauer patted Damato
down as a safety precaution before allowing him into the patrol car.'
The
dissent then stated that Patrolman Bauer was "within the bounds of the
Fourth Amendment in using the pat down to uncover weapons (of which
there were two), as well as contraband (marijuana).' 7 7
Justice Hill also believed that the majority did not rule correctly
concerning Patrolman Bauer's articulable suspicion. 7 8 The dissent argued
that when the information gathered by Patrolman Rettinger was combined
with what Patrolman Bauer gathered, one must be forced to conclude that
the patrolmen acted responsibly and within the limits set forth by the Fourth
Amendment and the Wyoming Constitution in performing daily duties on
the state's highways. '7 The dissent was satisfied that the patrolmen observed an articulable suspicion based on the experience and training they had
received as highway patrol officers. 80
ANALYSIS

When analyzing the issues present in Damato v. State, one will find
more than bargained for. Not only does the decision analyze the obvious
issues, but it also gets into some underlying issues on how the Wyoming
Supreme Court thinks law enforcement may be overstepping its boundaries
on the state's highways. This analysis will first look at the Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis of reasonable suspicion, and why it may be flawed.
Next, the subject of frisk will be analyzed. The analysis of this issue will
have an emphasis on the dissent's line of reasoning, and how it misconstrues
the exceptions to the scope of a frisk. Third, the question of inevitable discovery will be discussed. Finally, the analysis will ponder whether the
Wyoming Supreme Court may be willing to depart from federal constitu-

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. at 715-16 (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
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tional law concerning pretext stops when analyzed under state constitutional
law.
Reasonable Suspicion
The Wyoming Supreme Court was correct in holding Patrolman
Bauer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, other than the
traffic stop, to prolong the detention of Damato.' 8' When Patrolman Rettinger initially pulled Damato over, he noticed all of the circumstances that
were used to form Patrolman Bauer's reasonable suspicion." 2 While Patrolman Rettinger observed these circumstances, he believed he did not have
reasonable suspicion to detain Damato, and he let him proceed on his way.'83
The only additional piece of evidence Patrolman Bauer had, and that the
court acknowledged in its analysis, was the fact that Damato refused to have
his vehicle searched by Patrolman Rettinger.'84
The majority was very brief when discussing Damato's refusal to
have his vehicle searched.' 85 The court simply ruled "[t]he failure to consent
to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion."' 6
Based on this grounded rule of law, the court could not, and did not, use
Damato's failure to consent when determining if there was reasonable suspicion present.'87
Without the "failure to consent" factor, the state's argument for reasonable suspicion becomes much weaker. Patrolman Rettinger let Damato
proceed on his way because he felt he lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
him longer.'
With very similar circumstances, Patrolman Bauer believed
181.
See infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
182. Damato, 64 P.3d at 702.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 708. The court states in the facts that there were a few extra factors Patrolman
Bauer noticed that were not discussed by Patrolman Rettinger. Id. at 703. Patrolman Bauer
noticed Damato appeared to have pink "dope" eyes, and had Visine on the console. Id.
When the defendant retrieved his registration from the glove box, he mentioned something
about them being in the trunk, but he then corrected himself. Id. While these factors could
probably have been incorporated into the analysis, for some reason the majority decided not
to discuss them in the opinion. See also Janet Koven Levit, PretextualTraffic Stops: United
States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 149 (1996). Levit
points out that the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that when police conduct is
based upon hunches "[it] erodes the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
185.
See Damato, 64 P.3d at 708.
186.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997)).
187.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 708. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir.
1989) (refusal to consent could not be used to form basis for a Terry stop); United States v.
Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991) (refusal to consent could not be used as partial basis for
a Terry stop); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (an officer can not use
a withdrawal of consent during a consensual search as part of the basis for reasonable suspicion).
188.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 702.
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he did have reasonable suspicion to detain Damato.' 89 While it is possible
for two officers to evaluate things differently in the same situation, this difference can create confusion about what the officer was really taking into
consideration. It is very likely that Patrolman Bauer relied heavily on
Damato's failure to consent to a vehicle search when he was formulating
reasonable suspicion." Every person has a constitutional right to refuse a
search, and it was unlawful for Patrolman Bauer to rely on Damato's refusal
to contribute to his reasonable suspicion.' 9'
The Wyoming Supreme Court also gave little weight to the fact
Damato had his luggage in the back seat of his car and there were many fast
food wrappers on the floor of the vehicle. 92 The court was correct in concluding that these factors, and any suspicion associated with these factors, do
not provide reasonable suspicion. 93 These items can be associated with a
majority of innocent travelers. 9 Some people like to keep things, including
luggage, in a readily available place while traveling. Or, maybe the luggage
is too heavy to get into the trunk so the traveler leaves it in the back seat.
Many people, especially along Interstate 80, are often traveling long distances and it is not uncommon for people to eat fast food and leave trash on
the floor when on road trips. 95 Many law abiding Americans could be tar-

189. Id. at 703.
190. Id.
191.
See United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997); Rachel Karen Laser,
Comment, UnreasonableSuspicion: Relying on Refusals to Support Terry Stops, 62 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1161, 1177 (1995). Laser states there are four reasons why refusal to consent to a
search should not contribute to reasonable suspicion:
First, the use of a refusal contaminates the voluntariness of a truly consensual search. Second, it effectively turns noncoercive police encounters
into seizures. Third, it undermines the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
by giving police officers a tool with considerable potential for abuse.
Fourth, allowing the courts to find reasonable suspicion based on a failure
to consent grants them too much discretion. Under the "totality of the
circumstances" test, courts would be able to accord the refusal the weight
needed to arrive at the outcome they desire. This is particularly dangerous because courts have already considerably narrowed the traditional
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
192. Damato, 64 P.3d at 710.
193. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding fast food wrappers
in the car have become ubiquitous in modem interstate travel and do not serve to separate the
suspicious from the innocent traveler); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (holding
that having no luggage, other than a shoulder bag, can describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures if the Court
decided this would justify a foundation for a seizure); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942,
947 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding the possession of open maps and trash from fast food meals
describe a large category of presumably innocent travelers).
194. Wood, 106 F.3d at 942.
195. Id. at 946.
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geted for criminal behavior if these were the factors law enforcement used to
form reasonable suspicion.'9 6
Patrolman Rettinger and Patrolman Bauer stated Damato's departure
and destination points were factors that contributed to their reasonable suspicion.'97 The Wyoming Supreme Court could have looked more closely at
the fact that Damato did not provide the correct cities to which and from
which he was traveling.' People usually know their departure and destination points. However, Patrolman Rettinger used this evidence in a different
manner.'" Patrolman Rettinger stated he was suspicious of Damato because
San Diego and Omaha are both known drug hubs." ° The Wyoming Supreme Court was correct in concluding that this reasoning is a very weak
factor in trying to formulate reasonable suspicion.2 '° As the majority stated,
20 2
"Few large cities in the western states are not known drug hubs."

196.
See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441; Mark J. Kadish, The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes,
Trains, And Automobiles; And Now In The Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 748 (1997).
Kadish explains in his article that police officers often rely on drug courier profiles to determine who to stop and question about whether they are carrying illegal drugs. Id. The author
then explains that innocent citizens can easily match these profiles:
Citizens easily may match one of these profiles, because the profiles list
general and often contradictory characteristics: traveling by plane, train,
automobile, or bus; traveling alone, with friends, or with your children;
being young, middle-aged, or "older"; having short or long hair; traveling
to or from Fort Lauderdale, Miami, New York, Los Angeles, San Diego,
Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Austin, Birmingham, Chattanooga, Charlotte,
Dayton, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Newark, Tulsa, Dallas-Fort Worth, or
any foreign country; traveling in a business suit, casual clothes, or disheveled clothing; paying cash for your ticket; traveling without checking
your luggage, carrying only a garment bag, or checking several large suitcases; traveling and returning home in twenty-four to forty-eight hours;
being nervous or anxious when traveling; glancing around the airport,
bus, or train terminal; looking over your shoulder; making telephone calls
immediately after arriving at your destination; and taking public transportation to your destination.
Id. The author continues, stating that many courts prohibit the use of profile evidence as
evidence of guilt. Id. at 782. The courts have stated that using the drug courier profile will
cover many innocent individuals and that "every defendant has a right to be tried based on the
evidence against him or her, not on the techniques utilized by the law enforcement officers in
investigating criminal activity." Id.
197.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 708.
198.
Wood, 106 F.3d at 947. The Tenth Circuit stated that inconsistencies in information
may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
199.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 709.
200. Id.
201.
Id. at 709.
202. Id. See also United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 638 (10th Cir. 1998) (identifying the entire West Coast as a drug source area); United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,
1270 (10th Cir. 2001) (police testimony has identified an extremely broad range of known
drug source areas); Charles L. Becton, The Drug CourierProfile: "All Seems Infected Thai
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The Wyoming Supreme Court was also correct in ruling the confusion over the departure and destination points would have weighed differently in its analysis if Patrolman Rettinger would have asked Damato for an
explanation regarding the inconsistency.2 3 There are a number of reasons a
person could misstate a city name, but unless the officer asks for an explanation the reason will go unknown.2 4 It is not fair for an officer to assume the
worst-case scenario when the person may have a legitimate reason why the
answer seemed inconsistent.205
Damato's extreme nervousness was the final factor the Wyoming
Supreme Court had to evaluate in determining if there was reasonable suspicion in his behavior. 2' 6 This final factor could be considered the court's
"scapegoat" of reasoning. When the "extreme nervousness" in this case is
compared to the situation in United States v. Williams, there seems to be
some conflict as to what constitutes "extreme nervousness. '20 7 In Williams,
the Tenth Circuit stated nervousness plays a small role in determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists, but extreme and continued nervousness
can be given more weight. 208 According to the Tenth Circuit, if the nervousness continues throughout the entire traffic stop, and even appears to get
worse, the officer is entitled to take that into consideration.2 9
In Damato, it did not appear from the facts that the defendant's
nervousness ever dissipates into the "normal" nervousness exhibited during
a traffic stop. 210 Patrolman Rettinger said he observed Damato sweating
heavily, his carotid artery was pulsating hard and fast, and he was unable to
keep eye contact. 21 ' Based on the holding in Williams, the Wyoming Su21 2
preme Court could have put more weight into this factor than they did.
However, the court did not seem to want to find Damato's behavior suspicious in any way, which may have caused them to diminish the possible imTh' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow To The Jaundic'd Eye, " 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 449
(1987) ("DEA agents have an 'ipse dixit' tendency to classify any city as a drug trafficking
center.").
203.
Damato,64 P.3d at 710.
204.
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit stated
that an officer could be suspicious of a person who misstated something but once the person
corrected the mistake "suspicious inconsistencies virtually evaporated and any justification
his error yielded for further investigation dissipated." Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 708.
207.
Id. at 708-09; Williams, 271 F.3d at 1268-69.
208.
Williams, 271 F.3d at 1268.
209.
Id. The Tenth Circuit discussed that in Wood the officer and defendant had what
appeared to be a more common traffic stop encounter. Id. When encountering law enforcement, a citizen usually shows signs of nervousness but eventually tends to settle down later in
the traffic stop. Id. at 1268-69.
210.
See id. at 1268.
211.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 709.
212.
Williams, 271 F.3d at 1268.
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portance of his nervousness.2 13 For example, the Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded that the way in which Patrolman Rettinger continued to question
Damato would make any citizen nervous." 4 Furthermore, the court noted
that since Patrolman Rettinger did not treat the situation as a routine traffic
stop, Damato should not have to react to it as if it were a routine traffic
215
stop.

There is another problematic issue with the majority's evaluation of
Damato's nervousness. In the beginning of the decision, the court indicated
that the inquiry of reasonable suspicion is limited to Patrolman Bauer's stop,
the second officer to pull Damato over.216 The problem here is that the majority analyzed Damato's nervousness based on Patrolman Rettinger's
stop. 2" This evaluation does not give an adequate representation whatsoever
of what Patrolman Bauer actually witnessed. It is difficult to provide an
appropriate analysis to a problem when the correct information is not being
evaluated. Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court should have analyzed
21
Damato's nervousness as observed by Patrolman Bauer only. '
Although the majority's analysis of Damato's nervousness is questionable, the dissent also failed to correctly analyze the issue. In the dissent,
Justice Hill gives too much credit to the highway patrol officers. He stated,
When the information gathered by Rettinger is combined
with the information gathered by Bauer, the "articulable
suspicion" cases mandate a conclusion that the state troopers
acted responsibly, within the limits erected by the Fourth
Amendment (as well as the Wyoming Constitution), and in
conformance with the duties they are required to carry out
daily on our state's highways.2" 9
As discussed, there was no "combining" of information going on in
this stop. 220 The only additional information Patrolman Bauer had to form
reasonable suspicion when stopping Damato was that Damato refused to
have his vehicle searched by Patrolman Rettinger.22' The dissent does not
evaluate the factors individually because it "find[s] it unnecessary to further
213.
See Damato, 64 P.3d at 707-10.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 705.
217.
Id. at 708.
218.
Id. at 705. See also Becton, supra note 202, at 452. The author concludes that using
nervousness as a sign of guilt has the potential for abuse. Id. There are many psychological
factors that could be taken into consideration such as innate personality syndrome or fatigue.
Id.
219.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
220.
Id. at 708.
221.
Id.
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characterize or attempt to parse what the state troopers related in their testimony. 22 2 The dissent was satisfied with Rettinger and Bauer's experience
and training to determine articulable suspicion.223 Unfortunately, the articulable suspicion was based on factors that could be found in a majority of
vehicles on United States highways.2 24
An issue that could have an impact on this analysis, which was not
discussed by either the majority or dissent in Damato is the United States
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arvizu.225 Arvizu could leave
the majority's analysis in Damato suspect because of the way in which the
Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed the factors. 226 The majority did not ad227
dress Arvizu in the opinion at all, and it evaluated the factors individually.
While the majority does acknowledge the "totality of the circumstances"
test, it did not really apply it in the way the United States Supreme Court set
out in Arvizu.228 Damato is similar to Arvizu because both courts had to deal
with many seemingly innocent factors, and determine if all of those innocent
factors could be added up to make reasonable suspicion. 229 The United
States Supreme Court did find reasonable suspicion, while the Wyoming
Supreme Court did not."3 This could be problematic for the state court due
to the binding effect of the United States Supreme Court decision on issues
of interpreting the United States Constitution. Arvizu was decided on January 15, 2002, which gave the Wyoming Supreme Court plenty of notice of
the decision because Damato was not decided until January 29, 2003.231 The
Wyoming Supreme Court probably could have correctly applied the "totality
of the circumstances"
test, as outlined in Arvizu, and still have come out with
232
the same result.
It is also interesting that Justice Hill did not bring up Arvizu in the
dissent.233 The rule in Arvizu was exactly what the dissent was looking for
when it argued an officer should be able to use experience and training when
222.
Id. at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
223.
Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
224.
Id. at 710.
225.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
226.
For a discussion of how the factors should be analyzed, see infra note 228 and accompanying text.
227.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 708-10. The United States Supreme Court held that the way the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated and rejected the factors in isolation from each other
is not looking at the "totality of the circumstances" as previous cases have defined the phrase.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.
228.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 710. The United States Supreme Court stated in Arvizu that
"[a]lthough each of the series of acts was perhaps innocent in itself, we held that taken together, they warranted further investigation." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (citations omitted).
229. Damato, 64 P.3d at 708-10; Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-76.
230. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78; Damato, 64 P.3d at 710.
231.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 266; Damato, 64 P.3d at 700.
232. See supra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
233.
See generally Damato, 64 P.3d at 710-16 (Hill, J., dissenting).
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evaluating situations and determining reasonable suspicion.234 Using Arvizu
to argue the ideas in the dissent would have been much stronger than the
arguments that were actually used.235
While the Wyoming Supreme Court was correct in ruling there was
no reasonable suspicion for Patrolman Bauer to detain Damato as long as he
did, it is apparent the court was not even going to consider looking for reasonable suspicion in the available factors. The state made some valid arguments, which the court seemed to gloss over, and the rule of law in Arvizu
should have been addressed. Perhaps the Wyoming Supreme Court had
concerns with the way the Wyoming Highway Patrol was conducting itself
on the state's interstates and highways and was not willing to allow the
behavior to continue.
Frisk
Before analyzing the frisk, it is worth pointing out that there is some
disagreement about the facts surrounding the frisk. Patrolman Bauer testified that Damato argued with him about how fast he was traveling, so Patrolman Bauer told Damato he could look at the radar.236 The district court
found no such argument between Damato and Patrolman Bauer on the
Highway Patrol videotape of the stop.237 This disagreement, while discussed
in the court's opinion and dissent, is not of particular importance. Regardless of which set of facts are used, the Wyoming Supreme Court was correct
in concluding the frisk Patrolman Bauer performed on Damato was illegal.
The court was correct in stating Patrolman Bauer could have removed Damato from his vehicle for the sake of safety, as stated in Mimms.238
The court was also correct in concluding that although Patrolman Bauer
could legally ask Damato to exit the vehicle, there was no grounds for the
frisk. Terry v. Ohio is very clear that an officer may only frisk an individual
if the officer is justified in believing the person may be armed and dangerous.239 The majority stated Patrolman Bauer did not adequately explain why
234.
See Damato, 64 P.3d at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting) ("I am satisfied that, based upon
their experience and training, what they observed constituted 'articulable suspicion."'); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ("This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person."' (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418)).
235.
CompareDamato, 64 P.3d at 713-16, with Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 266.
236.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 703.
237.
Id. at 703 n. 1. The Highway Patrol videotape does not show any sort of conversation
at all regarding how fast Damato was traveling, or a request to see the radar. Id.
238.
Id. at 706-07.
239. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.5(a) (3d ed. 1996) ("An officer must be allowed to
conduct a protective search ... when he is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous, that
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he needed Damato to get into the patrol car and he did not have any reason
to believe Damato was armed and dangerous. ° Patrolman Bauer was looking for any possible reason to frisk Damato to find drugs, so he used the
excuse of Damato needing to get into the patrol car to view the radar. Because Patrolman Bauer did not have a justifiable belief that Damato was
armed, he did not have a right to infringe on Damato's rights and frisk
him.

24 1

While the majority's argument on this issue is very strong, the dissent offers a very different and flawed argument. First, the dissent argues
that Damato exited the car voluntarily to view the radar, and as a safety precaution Patrolman Bauer conducted the pat-down search.242 The dissent
states this is consistent with the Highway Patrol videotape. 243 The district
court and the majority found this explanation to be inconsistent with the
video. 2 "
The dissent also argued, "Bauer was within the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment in using the pat-down to uncover weapons (of which there were
two), as well as contraband (marijuana). 24 5
When conducting a frisk it
must first be determined whether the officer has a right to frisk the suspect.246 This right is dependent upon whether the officer justifiably believed
the suspect was armed and dangerous.247 The next step is to evaluate
whether the officer was within the scope of the frisk.2 48 This step allows the
officer to pat-down the suspect for weapons, and weapons only. 249 This rule

is, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.").
240.
Damato,64 P.3d at 706.
241.
Id. at 706-07. See also LAFAVE, supra note 239, § 9.5(a). According to LaFave there
are some instances where a right to frisk must follow directly from the right to stop the suspect. Id. Some lower courts have viewed the right to frisk as automatic when the suspect was
stopped on suspicion of an offense where a weapon would be present in committing the offense, to escape the scene, or for protection against the victim or others. Id. These types of
offenses include robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide, and dealing with
large quantities of narcotics. Id. But for other offenses, more circumstances must be present
in order for the frisk to be valid. Id. These types of offenses include trafficking in small
quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana, and lesser traffic offenses. Id.
242.
Damato,64 P.3d at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
243. Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 708.
245.
Id. at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting). It is not clear why Justice Hill felt it was necessary to
point out that Damato had two weapons in his pocket. Id. The issue here is whether a constitutionally protected right was infringed, not whether the officer can disregard constitutionally
protected rights based on the number of weapons found in a frisk. There is no rule that states
if you find more than one weapon in the frisk, the officer may disregard the Constitution. See
generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
246.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
249.
Id. at 30.
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has been expanded by the "plain-feel" doctrine in limited situations.25 ° The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that if an officer lawfully pats down
a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes
it immediately apparent that it is contraband, the warrantless seizure would
be justified.2 5'
Based on the wording, the dissent argued that according to this exception Patrolman Bauer had a right to frisk for weapons or contraband.252
This explanation of the rule grossly misconstrues the meaning. The plainfeel exception does not authorize officers to frisk for weapons or contraband.253 It simply makes a seizure of contraband legal if the officer felt the
contraband and it was immediately apparent that it was in fact contraband;
however, the initial frisk can only be justified as a search for weapons.2 54 In
Damato, if the frisk had been lawful then the discovery of the marijuana
would have been lawful, under the plain-feel doctrine, only if it was immediately apparent to Patrolman Bauer that it was marijuana in Damato's
pocket.255 According to the facts, Patrolman Bauer felt what he "believed"
to be marijuana in a cellophane bag.256 "Believing" and something being
"immediately apparent" are arguably two completely different standards.
The problem in this situation is that Patrolman Bauer did not take
the contraband out of Damato's pocket. 7 Patrolman Bauer asked Damato
what was in his pocket, and Damato pulled out the bag of marijuana. 8
Damato pulled the bag out on his own, making it voluntary.259 As long as
the frisk was legal, and no matter what Patrolman Bauer thought the object
was, the confiscation would be legal because Damato voluntarily pulled the
bag out of his pocket and gave it to Patrolman Bauer.2"'
Regardless of what Patrolman Bauer "believed" or who pulled the
marijuana out of Damato's pocket, the plain-feel exception is irrelevant in
Damato. Since Patrolman Bauer had no reason to frisk Damato for weapons

250.

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993).

251.

Id. at 376. See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,

FOURTH AMENDMENT

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
§ 2.2(a) (3d ed. 1996). The "plain touch" analysis is appropriate only

after the initial contact has been determined to be lawful. Id.
Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 715 (Wyo. 2003).
252.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376.
253.
Id.
254.
255.
Id.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 703.
256.
257. Id.
Id.
258.
259.
Id.
260. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A

TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

§ 8.1 (3d ed. 1996). The author points out that if consent is given, in this case a
voluntary removal of the drugs, evidence may be uncovered in situations where there is no
other lawful means for the search. Id.
AMENDMENT
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in the first place, the subsequent discovery
of marijuana was not within the
26
bounds of the Fourth Amendment. '
InevitableDiscovery
The dissent states that the majority "shrugs off the concept of inevitable discovery far too hastily. 2 62 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that
since the state did not argue the inevitable discovery doctrine applied when
no reasonable suspicion exists for calling a canine unit, it did not need to
address the issue.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in Wood that unless the officer has reasonable suspicion criminal
activity is occurring, the officer must allow the driver of a vehicle to proceed
on his way if he can produce a valid driver's license and prove that he is
entitled to drive the vehicle. 2" Since the majority did not find reasonable
suspicion, and the state did not argue the inevitable discovery doctrine applied when no reasonable suspicion existed, the issue was unreviewable.265
Nevertheless, the dissent may have a valid point on this issue. The
dissent stated, "[E]ven if I were convinced that Trooper Bauer's actions (in
patting down Damato and opening the trunk of the car) transgressed the
Fourth Amendment, then I can readily accept that the sniffer dog would have
inevitably discovered the damning evidence, and Damato would be in the
same hot water."2" The United States Supreme Court has ruled tainted evidence can be admitted if it inevitably would have been discovered by an
independent source.267 In Damato, the marijuana in the trunk was discov261.
Damato,64 P.3d at 706-07.
262. Id. at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 710.
264.
United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997).
265. Damato, 64 P.3d at 710, 715.
266. Id. at 715-16 (Hill, J., dissenting).
267.
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988). See also Troy E. Golden, Note
and Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands of the Fourth
Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the DisagreementAmong the FederalCircuits, 13 BYU J.
PuB. L. 97, 98 (1998). In Nix v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court was asked to
impose a good faith requirement of police officers before being able to invoke the inevitable
discovery doctrine. Id. at 101; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The Court rejected the
idea of a good faith requirement stating:
[A] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered; and even if an officer were
in such a position he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable practice ...because in that situation there will be little to gain from any dubious 'shortcuts' to obtain the evidence.
Golden, supra, at 101. However, some people argue that police officers are often in a position to determine whether the evidence would be inevitably discovered because they know
that inventory procedures are in place. Id. at 104. This gives no incentive to the police to
obtain a warrant or wait for a lawful inventory to occur during normal processing. Id.
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ered outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment making the evidence inadmissible.268 However, a canine unit was on its way to the scene, and the
dog would have discovered the marijuana in the trunk.269 In fact, once the
dog arrived it did indicate that there were narcotics in the trunk of Damato's
vehicle.27 ° The narcotics dog would have fulfilled the requirement for an
independent source discovering the evidence.2"7' Based on the prior case law,
the state could have had a strong argument on appeal in regards to the inevitable discovery doctrine.272 It is not clear why they did not argue this, but it
could be argued that the outcome of Damato would have been dramatically
different if it had been argued.273
Pretext Stops
The Damato majority seemed to be concerned with the issue of pretext stops and the "tag-team" fashion used to detain the defendant.274 The
majority spent a considerable amount of time on the issue by discussing Arkansas v. Sullivan.275 The Wyoming Supreme Court expressed having the
same fears as the Arkansas Supreme Court.276 The courts feared the officers
would look for any traffic violation as a pretext to conduct a narcotics investigation.277 Traveling seventy-seven (77) in a seventy-five (75) mile-perhour zone was not seemingly something for which an officer would pull a
driver over, and Patrolman Bauer was aware that Patrolman Rettinger suspected this particular driver of drug trafficking.2 78 Patrolman Bauer stopping
268.
Damato,64 P.3d at 711.
269.
Id. at 703. See also James A. Adams, The Supreme Court's ImprobableJustifications
For Restriction Of Citizens Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47
DRAKE L. REv. 833, 846 (1999). Canine sniffs are not considered searches and do not require
a warrant because the smell is emanating for the vehicle into a domain where any member of
the public has access to it. Id. If the officers and dogs are in legally permissible area then the
findings are permissible. Id.
270.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
271.
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 11.4(a) (3d ed. 1996). Circumstances justifying the use of the inevitable discovery rule are most likely to be present if investigative procedures were already in progress
before the evidence was discovered illegally. Id. In Damato, Patrolman Bauer had called for
the canine unit before he had approached Damato's vehicle. Damato, 64 P.3d at 703. The
canine unit was already on its way when Patrolman Bauer found the marijuana in the trunk.
Id. at 714 (Hill, J., dissenting).
272. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539.
273. Id.; Damato, 64 P.3d at 715 (Hill, J., dissenting).
274. Damato, 64 P.3d at 705-06.
275. Id. at 705 (citing Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001)).
276.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 705.
277. Id.
278.
Levit, supra note 184, at 157-58. This issue falls into the two competing standards
the United States Supreme Court has dealt with when evaluating pretext stops. Id. The first
standard is called the "would" approach. Id. This approach asks whether a reasonable officer
would have made the stop absent ulterior motives. Id. In the case of Damato, it is not likely
an officer would have pulled a vehicle over for traveling two miles per hour over the speed
limit. The second approach is called the "could" approach. Id. This approach asks only
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Damato was a textbook example of a pretext stop."" The court explicitly
stated, "[B]ecause Damato does not contend that the Wyoming Constitution
provides greater protection in this area, we must follow the federal constitutional decisions in Whren and Sullivan."2 ' The Wyoming Supreme Court
continued this line of reasoning by addressing the "tag-team" fashion in
which the Wyoming Highway Patrol pursued Damato.28 ' Once again, the
court stressed it was limited to an analysis of federal constitutional law.8 2
When analyzing federal constitutional law, the court was forced to find
Whren the controlling precedent because Patrolman Bauer observed Damato
committing a traffic violation.28 3
The lengthy discussion on this established doctrine makes it reasonable for one to believe that if Damato had challenged the search and seizure
under the Wyoming Constitution, the Wyoming Supreme Court may have
been prepared to find the pretext stop and the "tag-teaming" maneuver illegal. 2" The Wyoming Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that
even though the federal law establishes minimum requirements for individual protection, it does not mandate any maximum criteria as to the degree of
protection afforded an individual under state law. 2 5 Because of this criteria
the federal interpretations of the United States Constitution are merely persuasive when applied to a state constitution. 2 6 The Wyoming Supreme
Court attempts to adhere as closely to the federal interpretation as possible
unless there is some contrary direction by the state legislature.287 Here, the
whether a reasonable officer could have legally made the stop. Id. This "could" standard is
what the United States Supreme Court has adopted through its decision in Whren v. United
States. Id. at 165. In Damato, the Wyoming Supreme Court did discuss that Damato was
committing a traffic violation and Patrolman Bauer had the authority to pull him over.
Damato, 64 P.3d at 706. The presumption that highway patrol officers do not normally pull
motorists over for going two miles over the speed limit is enforced by the fact that Damato
was traveling seven miles over the speed limit when Patrolman Rettinger pulled him over, and
was not even issued a speeding citation. 1d. at 702.
279. See id. at 703. Patrolman Bauer stated that he was going to pursue the vehicle to "get
probable cause to stop him." Id. See also Levit, supra note 184, at 146.
280. Damato, 64 P.3d at 705.
281.
Id. at 705-06.
282. Id. at 706.
283. Id.
284.
Levit, supra note 184, at 167, 172. The Wyoming Supreme Court may have some
concerns with the "could" standard. In her article, Ms. Levit expresses the common concerns.
Id. One concern is the "could" standard sanctions pretextual traffic stops, ignores reasonable
suspicion, and undermines the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 167. Put simply,
the "could" standard eliminates the requirement of reasonable suspicion in traffic stops. Id.
285.
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 611 (Wyo. 1993). In Saldana, the court states that
"[u]nder the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the freedom of the state to
provide greater expectations of privacy for its citizens than those provided under the federal
constitution is guaranteed if, in either its legislative or judicial discretion, it deems it necessary or appropriate to do so." Id. at 612.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
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majority was obviously troubled by the liberties Patrolman Rettinger and
Patrolman Bauer took in their attempts to detain Damato, and it appears the
court may be ready to take the necessary steps to limit this type of intrusion
on individuals' Fourth Amendment rights on the state's interstates and
highways if a challenge is brought under the Wyoming Constitution.
CONCLUSION

In Damato v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court correctly suppressed the evidence found by the State of Wyoming and used against
Nicholas Damato. Patrolman Bauer did not have reasonable suspicion to
detain Damato. Nevertheless, while the decision may be correct, its analysis
could be considered suspect due to the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Arvizu. In Arvizu, the United States Supreme
Court explicitly held that factors are not to be analyzed individually but only
under the "totality of the circumstances." The Wyoming Supreme Court
claimed it was looking at the facts under a "totality of the circumstances"
test, but it appears the court neglected to use that standard and evaluated all
of the factors individually. The court individually excluded the fast food
wrappers, the luggage in the back seat, Damato's departure and destination
points, and Damato's nervousness. Because each of these factors were excluded individually it is hard to say they were considered in the "totality of
the circumstances." The Wyoming Supreme Court was also correct in ruling
that the frisk of Damato was illegal. There was no compelling reason shown
by Patrolman Bauer to make a frisk reasonable under the circumstances.
Because the contraband was found as a result of the frisk, the drugs found on
Damato's person should have been excluded. The dissent bought up a good
argument regarding the inevitable discovery doctrine. The canine sniff
would have discovered the drugs in the trunk regardless of the previous actions taken by Patrolman Bauer. However, the majority was correct in not
reviewing this argument, as the state decided not to argue it as a possible
way of admitting the evidence. From the decision, it appears the Wyoming
Supreme Court may be willing to divert from federal search and seizure
precedent when evaluating issues under the Wyoming Constitution. It is
possible the court would rule pretext stops and "tag team" efforts by the
highway patrol to be unlawful.
JENNY LYNN CRAIG
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